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Intrioduction 
Farms and farmers are not a homogeneous group. They 
differ significantly in their objectives in farming, risk exposure 
and risk attitudes. However, agricultural policies aimed at 
stabilizing income do not take into account these farm-level 
differences.  
Crop insurances are promoted with premium subsidies 
throughout the world, and with subsidies governments are 
able to regulate crop insurance markets. Due to international 
commitments, for example, the pressure to limit the minimum 
threshold for the farmers’ deductible is high (WTO, 1994).  
In developing crop insurance markets, one of the main 
problems to be solved is the setting of appropriate premium 
and subsidy levels for crop insurance schemes in order to 
fulfil the policymakers’ objectives of a high participation rate 
among farmers. This is a challenging task due to the 
heterogeneity among farms regarding their risk attitudes and 
positions. Thus, it is typical that high-risk farmers start to 
over-present and low-risk farmers to under-present in the risk 
pool, which leads to losses on the side of the insurers.  
In this study, the aim was to reveal how farmers differ in their 
willingness to pay for crop insurance. Data from a choice 
experiment were analysed with the latent class approach to 
reveal the number of latent groups and differences in 
farmers’ WTP for crop insurance.  
Methods 
As crop insurances are completely new products for Finnish 
farmers, we could not make assumptions about underlying 
farmer groups. Thus, a latent class model was used to 
investigate the different farmer segments. The heterogeneity 
is included in the model with latent number of classes. The 
farmer classes were determined purely based on the choices 
made by the individuals in the choice experiment (CARD1).  
IP €/ha Class1 Class2 Class3 
Deductible (10%) -2.42 -5.04 -3.67 
Scale (€1/ha) 0.044 0.014 0.059 
WTP*) 6.03 -10.92 6.55 
*) Deductible 30% and scale €300/ha  
One size policy does not fit all: 
Latent farmer groups in crop 
insurance markets   
Sami Myyrä ja Petri Liesivaara 
Luke, TALY 
Results 
A model with three farmer classes was selected based on 
Bayesian information criterion (BIC) statistics and 
reasonable class sizes. The Wald p-values indicate that 
the attributes were jointly significant, while further tests 
show that only the price attributes were class dependent. 
However, this is very important in the economic 
interpretation of the results.  
INSURANCE 
CARD 1  
Insurance 1 Insurance 2 No buy 
premium 
€/hectare  
12 16 
I would not 
purchase 
insurance 
Deductible  20% 20% 
Insurance 
type  
Yield index Farm insurance 
compensation 
€/hectare  
300 600 
MY CHOICE  □ □ □ 
Conclusions 
A new finding in this study was that stated preferences 
methods could be efficiently used in dividing risk-averse 
farmers into more distinctive groups. By applying well-
recognized econometric methods from other industrial 
areas, we defined farmers as being catastrophic loss and 
shallow loss preventers. These groups have earlier been 
recognized in quality terms, i.e. based on their 
preferences for risk taking, but have not been measured in 
a quantitative manner. In the data representing Finnish 
farmers, the number of catastrophic loss preventers 
exceeded the number of shallow loss preventers.    
Farmers in class 1 (42% of farmers) were named as 
catastrophic loss preventers. Their IP for the deductible 
is higher compared to the rest of the farmers. With 
increasing deductible levels, which they are willing to 
accept, they need to cover a larger part of yield risk by 
themselves. We named farmers in class 2 (30% of 
farmers) as risk lovers. They have the lowest IP for the 
scale. Risk lovers WTP for insurance products is on 
average terms negative. The third farmer class, 
comprising 28% of farmers, was named as shallow loss 
preventers. They are willing to pay premiums of €6.5/ha 
for each scale of €100/ha they receive. While having a 
highly negative IP for the deductible than class 1 farmers, 
they would not opt for higher deductible insurances.  
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